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A Typology of Cultures
Mary Douglas
I have chosen to talk about credibility and reflexivity because this is (I imagine)
the sort ofthing you expect from an anthropologist. They used to say that the big
difference between anthropology and sociology was not method, or history of
the discipline, so much as focus ofinterests; sociology, they would say, is driven
by its concern for current social problems, anthropology falls only too easily into
metaphysics and collectibles, erotic and exotic. To do honour to this occasion, I
have picked one problem on which to fasten my professional speculations: the
biosphere. The question is whether it is endangered and if so whether we should
do anything about it? On this topic I will ask whether the bad prophecies ofthe
scientists are credible. From credibility in general my speculations will be led to
culture and to reflexivity.
During the last few hundred years human action has drastically modified the
natural environment. No one is going to doubt the transformations that we have
effected, as to the disappearance of forests, as to the drainage ofwetlands, as to
irrigation ofdry lands, the extension and conversion ofgrazing lands. Given this
agreement among scientists (and ourselves) as to the past, what I find really inter-
esting is the disagreement about the future.
Is there really a global catastrophe ahead ofthe world? Some say No; most
scientists think it probable. Is there something we should do about it? Most scien¬
tists say definitely Yes, but the response from lay people is very divided. I want to
examine today the distribution of belief and unbelief. Like anthropologists we
can distance ourselves from the case, considering which scientists we should
credit, the soothsayers or the doom sayers, as if it were the same kind ofproblem
as that ofthe credibility ofmedicine, or ofreligious scepticism and fundamenta-
lism in the modern world.
How are we to give an account ofunbelief? When it is a matter ofhärm from
carcinogens, there is the excuse that the scientists are divided.1 When the
question is whether to be for or against nuclear power for peaceful puposes, again
the scientists are divided.2 But in the case of the härm we are doing to the
biosphere they speak with remarkable unity. Their consensus is all the more im-
pressive in that science in general has become much more cautious. It is less con-
fident of its claims than it was 50 years ago.
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The problem of the greenhouse effect takes us through the long sweep of
human history. It is partly a question ofscale. What used to be local incidents of
pollution or damage now involve many nations. The choice between ecological
conservation and economic growth now reflects complex linkages. Energy and
agriculture feed back to deforestation and climatic change.3 We have moved
from a regional to a global scale. The new integrative perspective emphasizes bio-
geochemical processes and their connections with climate. Parallel to the scienti¬
fic effort, the broad pattems of human development have been studied in the
world-system view of modern history. The modern world supports three times
the human population and 100 times the industrial activity that it did 100 years
ago. That is rapid change. As William Clark says in his introduction to Sustainable
Development ofthe Biosphere,
a new intellectual mood »has focused on the interplay of institutions, technologies,
and resources over what Braudel has called la longue dure'e, thus providing fertile ground
for the collaboration of economists, historians and geographers«.4
Presumably individual sociologists are engaged in this fervent discussion of
the future of our globe. But I do not hear loud or clear professional voices. In
every scientific over view I read some tribute to what is called »the social compo-
nent«, but I do not see that the sociologists feel bound to engage professionally
on what this social component is and how it works.
Most scholars treat the relevant period as the last 300 years. That is approxi-
mately from the bloodless English Revolution of 1688 through the bloody
French Revolution whose bicentennial we will celebrate next year, and on
through the 19th Century to today. In that time a number ofprocesses have crea¬
ted our present world order and, it is widely agreed, have produced seemingly ir¬
reversible changes. Here I quote from J. F. Richards for a wide-angle view ofthe
historical trends.
1 Expansion ofthe European frontier ofsettlement into the NewWorld, the great Eura-
sian steppe, and Australasia.
2 Steady growth in human population from 641 million estimated for 1700 to 443 5 mil-
lion estimated for 1980.
3 Dramatic growth in the spatial extent of cities and their population.
4 Increased use of fossil fuels and hydroelectric power, thus creating a revolution in
transport, Communications and industrial production.
5 Development of scientific methods, institutions and means for research and dis-
covery.
6 Development ofnewweaponry with global reach and capacity for near-global destruc¬
tion.
7 Dramatic increase in our ability to eure the body and curb disease.
8 Growth in scale, efficiency and stability of complex Organisation (i.e. bureaucracies).
9 Emergence of self-regulating, price-fixing global markets for goods and Services.
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10 Emergence ofa world division oflabour between the North (or core) developed coun-
tries and the developing countries of the South (or periphery).
That sums it up, except for a drastic effect on the peoples whom anthropolo-
gists traditionally study. We have to add that along with all of this has gone the
expansion of more intensive sedentary agriculture and in consequence the
squeeze on tribal peoples engaged in shifting cultivation or in pastoral nomad-
ism.
Evidently our cultural bias over this period has been towards expansion. We
have made ourselves very efficient in exploiting natural resources. But these
social and scientific trends have had the following effects on the environment.
1. World expansion of arable land: for every region an enormous and unre-
versed growth of arable land, to match the demand from swelling popu-
lations, and resulting in a near doubling of the pace of soil erosion in the
world.
2. Deforestation, woods and forests in retreat before the advance ofarable land.
»As early as the seventeenth Century the forested plains of eastern Germany and
Poland underwent steady clearance and plowing as the market for eastern European
wheat expanded. By the eighteenth Century New World lands in eastern North Ameri¬
ca and in coastal Brazil feit pressures for marketable wood and arable land. By the early
nineteenth Century forested Covers in India and the midwestern USAwere being felled
for development purposes, and in the mid-nineteenth Century rapid deforestation had
begun in Himalyan India, Australasia, Southeast Asia, South Africa, Manchuria, Tai¬
wan, and elsewhere. The end ofthe Century brought east and west Sub-Saharan Africa,
the American far west and Siberia into this process. The twentieth Century has seen a
nearly global onslaught on woodlands, with, after World War II, swelling pressures for
economic development in the era of decolonisation.«
3. The drainage ofwetlands, especially with use ofnew technology since 1870,
has dramatically increased. The drying up of marshes and swamps releases
stored carbon into the atmosphere and changes water tables. When this type
ofhabitat disappears, many plant and animal species retreat or disappear too,
and tribal communities who used to live on them are forced to work as share-
croppers in the new agricultural regime.
4. Irrigation of arid lands is a major environmental change. The trend to con-
trolled watering and cultivation of dry lands means that few rivers flowing
through arid or semi-arid regions remain untapped by irrigation schemes,
with effects on the world hydrological cycle. As Professor Richards says:
Making the deserts bloom corresponds to some ofour deepest aesthetic and cultural
instincts. The drama of towering dams, huge turbines, and massive canal Systems has
made large irrigation Systems one index of modernity (:63).
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5. Grazing lands ofthe world have been reduced in favour ofarable and heavy,
sustained grazing for supplying meat to the increased human population
finally depletes the grasslands.
Summing up, Richards says that in the relatively short period since 1700
human control over the natural environment has transformed it into an anthro-
pogenic or human-determined System:
By far the most important reason for the changes that have occurred in the biota, the
atmosphere, and the oceans is the growing efficiency and global scale ofman's economic
activity. (:68)
His wide-angled survey is a corrective to the waywe usually hear ofthreats and
disasters, which is one at a time, encouraging hope for item-by-item Solutions.
But the bio-sphere is one ränge ofinterlinked problems, not caused by car-drivers
as such, nor now suddenly by domestic use of aerosol pumps or even by recent
cutting down oftrees; the problems have been going on for a long time and are
not to be solved so easily merely by giving up one or other ofthese activities. The
trends are produced by very basic transformations ofour social Organisation. He
speaks for many other scientists when he says that he does not expect these
trends to be diverted or reversed. We are going to have to live with them. In
which case, the question is about the kinds ofsocial Organisation best able to deal
with the global threat. Such a question falls right into the court of the sociolo¬
gists.
A biologist asks: »What images are appropriate for thinking about an Earth
transformed by human action?« (Clark: 11) One group ofecologists seems to use
a model ofthe Garden ofEden spoiled by human misdoings; anotherprefers the
model ofa garden that needs a lot ofcare. Another asks what kind ofsociety can
be envisaged that will be able to deliver the care? To me and to many the question
seems urgent. I am convinced by the evidence that, as far as we can teil, the bio¬
sphere is subject to unprecedented strains. I am afraid ofholes in the sky and of
global warming and floods and droughts, and I also take it for granted that we
should be thinking ofhow to forfend such extremities. But I find that many ofmy
friends mistrast these tales ofdoom; there have been too many in the past; nature
has proved herseif to be too robust for them to believe in the advent ofa global
disaster. Others are fatalists; they believe in the seriousness ofthe problems as
sincerely as I do, but feel that we are totally impotent; we might just as well ignore
the warnings, for there is nothing that we can do or ever could have done.
What about our diverse attitudes? What do the sociologists say? Are our
views just randomly distributed? just psychological? Or is there an underlying
cultural explanation for our respective optimism, fatalism and pessimism? In an
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interesting set of surveys in the 1970's Stephen Cotgrove found that the British
public tended to fall into two groups taking opposite views ofthe stability and
resilience of nature: on the one hand some respondents whom he dubbed the
cornucopians believed in the unendingly lavish bounty of nature, and so could
not get worried about rumours ofresources drying up; on the other hand respon¬
dents whom he called the catastrophists believed that nature is fragile and unable
to resist the crash that is just round the corner. Roughly speaking these divergent
views of nature were interpreted as justifications for the correlated preferences
expressed by the same subjects on political or economic issues.
The idea that polarised views ofnature enter into any well-developed cultural
debate is central to my own work as an anthropologist. I am about to argue that if
sociologists wish to comment on the social component in the transformation of
the environment they would do well to join the anthropologists and think
systematically about culture. First they might like to do a little auto-analysis and
decide whether they are cornucopians, catastrophists or fatalists, and having
recognized their own position they might like to consider whether it enters their
larger agenda for life and art. If their attitude to nature turns out to be not very
relevant in upholding any ofthe rest oftheir serious thinking, I would be inclined
to count them along with the fatalists, those who think it may or may not be true
but in either case regard it as no concern oftheirs. It will be a help in following the
argument to have made up your mind as to where you stand.
Cornucopians! Catastrophists! Fatalists! As we listen to the Biosphere scien¬
tists we match their narrative with our own narrative about how the world ought
to be, and is. And so, according to its fit, we doubt or believe.
What is culture? I take it to be an ongoing, never resolved argument about
rightness of choice. Following Pierre Bourdieu I take high culture to be an ar¬
gument about taste, and I take low culture to be an argument about morals. In
both the stakes are heavy. In the debate one side is striving to capture and con¬
trol legitimacy for themselves, the other to defend the control they have. Argu¬
ment is too soft a word for the struggle. Since the winning side gains legitimacy,
there is little left for the losers but drastic down-grading or exile. Both arguments
(about taste and morality) take place within an existing framework ofpower and
authority, consequently within a structured framework (that Bourdieu calls habi-
tus). Being structured means of course that culture cannot affirm all things.
Something affirmed means something eise denied. Blindspots and unthinking
rejection are just as essential to culture as seeing and affirming. The great merit
of this view is that it systematically connects the cognitive and affective side
of culture to the strategies of the contestants for legitimacy.9 Their rhetorical
and other strategies can be analysed as part of their struggle to create the good
society.
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We seem to be very short on modeis ofthe good society. Over the last 300
years the winning side in the cultural debates ofthe world has successfülly presen¬
ted a steady, cumulative argument in favour of expansion, individual freedom,
the sloughing off ofchains and shackles. As we saw, expansion has indeed taken
place. The image of restriction is a menacing spectre of blind superstition and
unreason. And yet, as I hear the ecologists, there will be a need for legitimate con¬
trol on a global scale. While legitimacy is as hard as ever to achieve, the message
of the scientists is that the social component in the matter of the biosphere is
about legitimate authority. It goes almost without saying that to put the cultural
machine into reverse after 300 years is deeply counter-cultural. For some the
prospect is so contradictory and unacceptable to their active role in the cultural
debates that either they say nothing or they are forced to take the negative po¬
sition of unbelief.
An expressive sociology speaks for the dominant culture to which the profes-
sion belongs. It speaks with a strong voice when it defends its cultural ideals. It
can and must express the sorrows ofthe oppressed. It can and must denounce in-
justice. Far be it from me to imply even faintly that sociology should not be fully
engaged in the cultural struggle of its time, and fully expressive. But it needs to
wear another hat when thinking about the threat to the biosphere. To enter this
debate we need a reflexive sociology. That would be a sociology temporarily de-
tached from its normal expressive functions. Sociology would need to stand out-
side ofitselfand its cultural niche. It might need to consider what kind ofsociety
would be able to curb the cultural pressure which it faithfully serves under its
other hat, the cultural pressure to delegitimize control and to license ever more
exploiting, escaping and expanding.
A reflexive culture that takes all sides at once is a contradiction, but I dont
think that the idea ofa reflexive sociology is absurd. It only needs to set a deliber-
ate trap to catch the reflexive moments in which we privately indulge. Individu-
ally we are capable of great honesty and insight. We can see our postures as re-
sponding to institutional pressures. We are individually capable of recognizing
ourselfin the Other and, without losing sight ofthe quality ofotherness, we are in¬
dividually capable of embracing the stranger. Cultural analysis can try to do
formally what we do informally and privately. Cultural analysis can make a
gimmick to capture formally the coherence and rightness of other possible po-
sitions in any cultural debate. My platform today is to invite sociologists to join
the exercise, and my task is to explain it.
Cultural analysis comes in several forms and deals with a whole ränge of
questions. For the issue in hand I want to present some ofthe work of Michael
Thompson and other anthropologists who have studied the ecologists' views of
nature.10 They find that for any position we might want to take about the fragility
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or the resilience ofnature, there is a practical ecologists' view that we could cite to
back our case. Certain »myths ofnature« circulate among natural resource ecolo¬
gists who manage forests, fisheries or grazing lands. The ecologists in question
observe how the managed eco-systems are modified by the humans. Making sug-
gestions about how to improve their own work they are particularly interested in
management problems, that is, in how things go wrong. Thus their concern is on
trying to avoid surprises. Four kinds of myths about nature's predictability
emerge from their reports.
Nature is capricious,
Nature is fragile,
Nature is robust,
Nature is only robust within limits.
Each of these myths is represented by a little picture of a ball in a landscape.
JQ.
1. The myth of capricious nature has the ball rolling any-
where on a flat plane. There is no knowing what it will do
next, and no use theorizing about it. This gives grounding
for the fatalist whose agnosticism is at least theoretically safe
from surprises sprung by nature.
2. The myth of fragile nature has the ball on the top ofa
mound, delicately poised in the only place it can be in equi¬
librium. The smallest shift will roll it off the landscape al-
together. For an example ofa theory based on this kind of
myth they cite the Malthusian prophecy ofoverpopulation.
3. The myth that nature is robust has the ball in the bottom
ofa curve; which ever way it is pushed off centre it can only
roll back into position again. (For an example ofthis kind of
grounding myth, Timmerman cites Adam Smith's theory
ofthe invisible hand, where all perturbations will work out
for the good.) This is the myth that encourages bold, indivi-
dualistic experimentation, expansion and technological
development.
4. When nature is robust within limits the ball is in a dip
between two hillocks; it can roll within specific limits and
be expected to come back safely, but too big a push risks
sending it over the edge ofthe containing frame. This is the
myth to encourage nsk-averse planning controls, govern¬
ment Intervention, restrictions on the market.
The anthropologists have matched the four myths ofnature favoured by prac¬
tical ecologists to four positions in the cultural struggle.
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Fatalists:
Nature Capricious
Q
Hierarchists:
Nature robust
within limits
Entrepreneurial Expansionists:
Nature robust
Communards:
Nature fragile
Myth ist not being used here in any derogatory sense. Each ofthe ecological
views is as fully justifiable as the others. Each sums up an enormous experience
and vast array of learning about humans interacting in eco-systems. There is no
way that any of them could be proved right or wrong except in the event. The
research that I am outlining much too briefly is a cultural theory of surprise.11
The collaborators on the surprise research have taken a Start from my own
account offour kinds ofsocial strategies, with their concomitant beliefs.12 These
come out of two dimensions of social relations, collectivist/individualist,
unstructured/structured. The four positions each combines a preferred pattern of
social relations with certain values which justify and sustain the preference. The
theory is that elements ofeach position form a distinctive, unified cultural pack-
age which cannot be unpacked or re-combined without radical social change.
My own research interest has been in the recurrence of these stable cultural
patterns and their associated social structures. The surprise theorists have taken it
much fürther. They have reformulated the cultural patterns in ecological terms.
Working with biologists it was a step to mutual understanding to describe each
cultural pattern as a specialised use of resources, each using the environment in
ways that are incompatible with the needs ofthe other cultural types; the grand
cultural debate is comparable to the struggle between species competing for eco¬
logical dominance. The strategies deployed in the struggle by each cultural form
map on to an appropriate »myth ofnature«. Each myth is used as a rhetorical re-
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source in the cultural struggle. Furthermore, the use ofthe myth feeds backto the
persons who deploy it so that it forms part of their view ofthe way the world is.
This makes good sense. People are not knaves and fools; they believe and act
upon their belief. The myth ofnature comes as part ofthe package that they have
chosen when they opted for a cultural form. Within that package it is totally con-
vincing that nature is fragile; or robust; or only robust within constraints; or just
capricious, whichever is the right myth for the rest ofthe argument. Consequent-
ly we can expect that, being sincere and clever, everyone will have put their
money where their mouth is. The comunards will have been reducing their de-
mands on nature as they beseech the rest ofus to do the same; the entrepreneurs
will have gone on with their expansionist policies; the hierarchists will have been
trying to plan and control, while the fatalists stand back and mock their futile
efforts.
For surprise research the object oftrying to understand cultural bias is to work
out the kinds ofsurprises that each culture lays up in störe for itself. Supposing in
the event nature turns out to be really ephemeral and the biosphere splits and
slides away; then the communards will not be surprised. Saying »We told you so«
will be small comfort to themselves and to the surprise-holders, in this case the
entrepreneurs and the hierarchists. But supposing in the event nature turns out to
be robust enough to take all the punishment we mete out to her. Then the sur¬
prise-holders will be the communards. They will find that they didn't need to
have reduced their style of life, that they have gained little while their opponents
have made large fortunes. And so it goes on. The only people who will get no sur¬
prise are the fatalists because they made no bets. I am always intrigued to know
how they manage to remain so detached.
For today my main interest in the surprise game, as it is called, is its opening
upon reflexivity. In this aecount what is said in the cultural debate is believed and
acted upon and to some extent self-confirming until the big moment ofsurprise.
My argument above led to the point at which I observed how few images we have
ofgood societies. Staying inside the expressive culture, we can only see one good
society, our own culture, and the Other as its bad Opponent. For the present
global problem we would do well to develope gimmicks for appreciating other
forms of life, and for contemplating them without rivalry. Such a gimmick, I
suggest, is this form of cultural analysis. It presents the social Organisation as a
cognitive screen. What the social Organisation lets through its cultural meshes is
seen, what it blocks are the blindspots. The finer the mesh, the finer the nuances.
The longer the perspective, the more history can be held in mind. The more
varied and numerous the elements, the richer the pattern, the more the variety of
strangers and the more levels ofinclusion. The more self-conscious the awareness
of our negotiators, the more hope for conciliatory and strong counsels.
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At this point someone teils me that reflexivity is not a question that can be
handled sociologically. Certainly in its literary, and philosophical and psycholo-
gical aspects many doubts can be raised. Such as, How can we know that others
know themselves as knowing subjects? What is consciousness? And self-con-
sciousness? Among sociologists such issues have to be more open to inspection
and counting. Even though self-knowledge be internal and private, most ofthe
categories ofthe Other are public. There is nothing to stop us from comparing
modern industrial societies on a count ofthe sheer number of kinds of people
that they legislate for. There may be more or less ofnested administrative catego¬
ries, arranging for us to line up by age, immigrant Status, gender, color, birth, edu¬
cation, health, criminality. It should be illuminating to check the varieties of
classifications and their numbers and other features of these classifications
against other features of the culture.
One ofthe salutory effects ofthis gimmick towards reflexivity is that it pushes
its practioners to clarify their own preferences. My own preference has emerged
as an idealised form of hierarchy. This has always given me to some degree the
professional advantage offeeling out ofkilter with the times. It gives me a stand-
point from which to see that in this 300 year expansionary trend ofWestern civi-
lization two kinds of cultures have come to dominante, two that are opposed to
hierarchy. Today I am arguing that unless we learn to control our cultivated gut
response against the idea ofhierarchy we will have no modeis ofthe good society
to counter our longestablished predatory, expansionary trend. By sheer default,
among cultural forms hierarchy is the rejected Other. We take it for granted that
hierarchy will always fall into traps of routinization and censorship; we see its
dangers but have no clear model of how it would be if it worked well. Yet hier¬
archy is the social form that can impose economies, and make constraints ac-
ceptable.
I hope you heard me then. I was using the appropriate myth ofnature, that she
is only robust within limits, to support my preferred cultural form. I expect to
hear you doing the same through this congress.
The argument started with the biosphere and with the question whether it is
credible that it is in danger; and if it is, should something be done? and at the very
least should not sociologists consider the kind of society that can best deal with
global crisis? My use of cultural theory suggests that in each case the response is
never purely individual. Trying to think of such basic issues taps into deep emo¬
tional reserves. The answers well up from attitudes to authority, to accountability
and freedom, and from any other experiences that define the relation ofone per¬
son to others. The principles tend to be inculcated in the school playground, if
not at the mother's knee. We have each been making small choices ofwhom we
like to consort with and how much competition we can bear. The little choices
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lead to big institutions in which we feel comfortable and to a way of life that
we want to protect. There is no innocent answer to the question ofwhat sort of
good society would best cope with a fragile biosphere. So let us not pretend to be
innocent.
Finally let me anticipate the disdain ofthe academic fatalists in our midst. To
me, sitting with the hierarchs, convinced that we can and should do something,
their disbeliefis amazing. For them, my credulity is naive, or my claimed concern
is ideologically suspect. Their doubts come at two points: they are skeptical about
knowledge and skeptical about effective action. Some ofthem doubt the possibil-
ity of knowledge about anything. They are not quite joining the brahmins and
buddhist philosophers who teach that reality is illusion. For the fatalists in an¬
thropology (I cannot speak for those in sociology) skepticism about comparisons
and categories does not inhibt them from writing, for it leaves them scope for ex-
ploring the cage oftheir own consciousness. Others doubt whether trying to do
something is going to be worth while. This in itself is a form ofwithdrawal from
the world. Some of them are alone, and others belong together in sects or com-
munes. How do they console themselves?
Our academic fatalists in their opting out ofchoice remind me ofthe intelli-
gentsia of 19th Century Russia described by Isaiah Berlin13 in his profoundly in-
sightful Russian Tbinkers. He describes how these radicals came to decide that
there was nothing to be done to eure the evils ofthe time and so embraced the
consolations ofthe romantic movement. There they were, a small educated class,
with a hostile, arbitrary government on the one hand and an uncomprehending,
oppressed peasantry on the other: there they were, a few, eultivated people, sensi¬
tive to the gross injustices ofthe regime, and nervous ofthe dangers of reform,
dangerous to the regime in which they held a privileged but ineffectual place.
German romanticism was a liberation for them in the sense that a liberator
doesnt solve problems but transforms them. In Berlin's words, romanticism was
a new framework in which »old problems cease to have meaning and new ones
appear which have their Solutions as it were, already to some degree prefigured in
the new universe in which you find yourself. . .« (:123). The new universe was
aesthetically refined, personal consciousness was eultivated to a high degree, it
was sad but uplifting.
Berlin's description ofthe intelligentsia seduced away from their radical pro¬
gram by speculations upon appearance and reality has a bearing on my theme.
Following Napoleon's invasion, Russia became suddenly aware ofEurope and of
being in the middle ofit, (as we have become aware recendy ofthe globe and our¬
selves in it). He describes the growth of patriotic nationalism (a growth we also
know), and the collective sense of guilt for squalor, poverty, inefficiency and
chaos. (And we also know the sense of guilt.) His essay implies that the intelli-
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gentsia could have done something. His sardonic tone says that they didn't have
to be liberated from their guilt and concern; they could have stayed with it and
found ways of being effective for reform.
This is not the lesson I would draw. One cannot say that the young Russian
radicals in the 1830's to 50's shouldn't and didn't have to be fatalists. Cultural
theory is not judgmental or determinist, not in the least. The example serves
several purposes. For doing analytic sociology the intelligentsia ofCzarist Russia
illustrate the social circumstances in which the fatalist position is attractive.
There can be many reasons for opting out ofpressing problems: One may be that
they seem too overwhelming for correction, and another that thinkers occupy a
totally peripheral niche in the distribution ofpower and influence, and another is
that the same thinkers themselves are privileged in the regime they dislike. This
response would explain the disbelief and apathy that some sociologists feel in
face of the biosphere threat.
Still withholding judgment, we can recognize Isaiah Berlin himself as an ex¬
ample of another position. A centralist, avoiding the periphery, he clearly be-
lieves that concern can be transmuted into responsibility. This is the position
from which the hierarchy looks at life. As far as biosphere doom is concerned, the
hierarchists are practicing believers. It is terrifiying and something should be
done. Right or wrong, they will do something. The prospect ofthe hierarchists
determining what to do is of course distasteful to the fatalists. But they should
argue the case for not believing from an analytic sociological theory and they
should not merely perform the expressive fünctions oftheir own culture. This is
the advantage oftaking up cultural theory. And now I will move into the expres¬
sive mode myself.
The biosphere is too large. There are smaller worlds in which cultural analysis
can be applied to disbelief, for example, the so-called social sciences which would
do well occasionally to move out oftheir expressive mode, reffaining from ardent
defense oftheir cultural positions. To justify their role as analysts the social scien¬
ces absolutely need to get distance from their own commitments. Cultural
theory is a tool to dispel the fog of expressive propaganda. Cultural analysis is a
practice that forces argument on to a franker plane; disputants find themselves
arguing directly about how they want decisions to be taken and what kind of
society they want, and then how they expect it to function, and from there they
are led to their own myths of nature. Is it a ball that might slide anywhere? is it
robust? is it fragile? And human nature too: cultural theory will not let disputants
espouse one view ofhuman nature that is incompatible with their view ofsociety
and nature. In this perspective sociological argument loses none of its interest.
This being so, and cultural theory having so many merits, I find it hard to
understand why you, the sociologists, can want to stand aside. I would like to
96
persuade you out of your apathy and disbelief. Perhaps you regard the tasks of
cultural theory to be impossible, the problems too overwhelming, the results too
uncomfortable. Whatever the cause ofyour having so far refrained from joining
in the practice of this method, I am Standing within the branch of the social
sciences that I have been trained in and speaking in the expressive mode, inviting
you to be here too.
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